Network-based Origin Confusion Attacks against HTTPS Virtual Hosting

Antoine Delignat-Lavaud, Karthikeyan Bhargavan
Prosecco, Inria Paris-Rocquencourt
# The Web Security Protocol Stack

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protocol Stack</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>JavaScript runtime</strong></td>
<td>(scripts, content scripts, DOM, WebWorkers, ASM.js, …)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HTML5 / Browser environment</strong></td>
<td>(same origin policy, frames, windows, postMessage, CSP, …)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HTTP Protocol</strong></td>
<td>(Redirections, cookies, HSTS, Origin header, Virtual Hosting, …)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PKIX / X.509</strong></td>
<td>(certificates, certification authorities, OCSP, certificate transparency, …)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transport Layer Security (TLS/SSL)</strong></td>
<td>(SNI, session resumption, Channel ID, ALPN, …)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Our Previous Efforts

• **miTLS**: verification of the TLS protocol based on a **reference implementation with refinement types**

• **Positive results** [S&P’13, CRYPTO’14]: precise (but complex) statement of TLS API’s security goals

• **Attacks** [S&P’14, S&P’15]: Triple Handshake, SMACK, FREAK...
Current Challenge

• How do the low-level cryptographic guarantees of TLS translate to high-level Web security guarantees?

• Moving up the protocol stack, things quickly get messy (e.g. secure cookies, HSTS... break layering abstraction)

• Cross-protocol attacks (e.g. Cookie Cutter [S&P’14])
In this paper

We present a new class of attacks against the deployment of TLS on the Web that allow a network adversary to bypass the cross-origin isolation between domains that share some transport-layer credentials.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HTTP Request</th>
<th>HTTP Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GET /p/ath?k=v HTTP/1.1</td>
<td>HTTP/1.1 200 OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host: <a href="http://www.x.com:8080">www.x.com:8080</a></td>
<td>Content-Type: text/plain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cookie: User=Alice</td>
<td>Content-Length: 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hi Alice!
HTTP Virtual Hosting

https://x.y.com:4443/u/v?a=K&b=L#hash

Routing
Select virtual host

Request processing
Generate response

Kept by Browser
HTTP Reminder

POST /login HTTP/1.1
Host: login.x.com:444
Origin: https://y.com
Content-Length: 20
User=Alice&Pass=1234

HTTP/1.1 302 Redirect
Location: /
Set-Cookie: SID=XXX;
domain=.x.com;
secure; httpOnly
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=ZZZ;
includeSubDomains
HTTPS Reminder

Client nonce, supported ciphers, SNI

Server nonce, cipher, SID, certificates, (key exchange)

[Certificates], key exchange, [cert verify], CCS, finished

[session ticket], CCS, finished

Client

Server
HTTPS Reminder

Client nonce, ciphers, SNI, session ticket, SID

Server nonce, cipher, SID, [new ticket], CCS finished

CCS, finished

Client

Server
TLS vs HTTP Identity

- **Transport layer**
  - Server Name Indication (SNI)
  - Certificate (union of CN and SAN)
  - Session identifier
  - Session ticket, Channel ID

- **Application layer**
  - Host header [Origin header]

Authentication and authorization in TLS depend on application behavior
Managed by application!
HTTPS Multiplexing

[Diagram showing HTTPS Multiplexer with connections to Virtual Hosts 1 to n, each pair (IP_i, Port_i) connected to the Multiplexer]
Virtual Hosting in Practice

```plaintext
ssl_session_ticket_key "/etc/ssl/ticket.key";
ssl_session_cache shared:SSL:1m;

server { #1
listen 1.2.3.4:443 ssl;
server_name www.a.com;
ssl_certificate "/etc/ssl/a.pem";
root "/srv/a";
}
server { #2
listen 4.3.2.1:443 ssl;
server_name ~^(?<sub>api|dev)\..a\..com$;
ssl_certificate "/etc/ssl/a.pem";
root "/srv/api";
}
server { #3
listen 2.1.4.3:443 ssl;
server_name www.learn-a.com;
ssl_certificate "/etc/ssl/learn-a.pem";
root "/srv/learn";
}
```
Request routing

• (IP, port) of request = (IP, port) of chosen host

• TLS settings picked from host whose name matches SNI, or default (fallback)

• Request is routed to host whose name matches Host header, or default (fallback)
Virtual Host Confusion

• Current routing algorithm do not guarantee the selected virtual host was intended to process the request

• In many cases, a network attacker can redirect a request to an unintended server without causing a TLS error
  • Known vector [C. Jackson et al., CCS’07]
Virtual Host Confusion

• Two servers for the same domain on different ports (a.com:443 & a.com:4443)
  • Port always ignored in Host header.
  • Attacker can redirect freely between ports
  • Port is essentially useless for same-origin policy
Virtual Host Confusion

• One certificate {x.a.com, y.a.com} (or *.a.com)
• Server at IP X only handles x.a.com
• Server at IP Y only handles y.a.com
  • Attacker can redirect packets from X to Y
  • Server at Y returns a page from y in x.a.com origin
A network attacker can transfer HTTP weaknesses and vulnerabilities (e.g. XSS, user contents, open redirectors, cross-protocol redirections, X-Frame-Options, CORS, ...) across origins that are related at the transport layer.
Is this really a concern in practice?

• Cloud hosting: unrelated, mutually distrusting domains are served through the same servers

• Multi-domain (SAN) & wildcard certificates are extremely common and often include domains with different HTTP security characteristics

• Some content delivery networks (CDN) use shared certificates for customer domains (e.g. Cloudflare)
Concrete Attacks

Watch exploit videos on https://bh.ht(vc
Impersonation through Akamai

- The default Akamai virtual host is an open proxy: https://a248.e.akamai.net/6/6/6/attacker.com/query
- Routing fallback to an open proxy allows impersonation

Hello, I am the attacker.

Here are the cookies you sent me:

```javascript
array(4) {
    ["_utma"] =>
    string(54) "176212410.819947620.1386092553.1386092553.1386096268.2"
    ["_utmc"] =>
    string(9) "176212410"
    ["_utmz"] =>
    string(70) "176212410.1386092553.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)"
    ["_utmmb"] =>
    string(25) "176212410.2.10.1386096268"
}
```
Impersonation through Akamai

Browser

Connect
a.com certificate
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: a.com
R(a.com/)

Connect
z.com certificate
GET /p/x.com/ HTTP/1.1
Host: bad.z.com
R(x.com/)

Connect
Akamai certificate
GET /p/x.com/ HTTP/1.1
Host: xxx.akamai.net
R(x.com/)

Akamai PoP

Virtual Hosts

a.com certificate
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: a.com
R(a.com/)

z.com certificate
GET /p/x.com/ HTTP/1.1
Host: bad.z.com
R(x.com/)

Akamai (default)

Reverse Proxy

Fallback

a.com Backend server
cdn.z.com Backend Server
x.com server
Impersonation through Akamai

• Attack was present for 15+ years

• At least 12,000 domains affected including 7 out of top 10 Alexa websites in the US

• Quickly fixed following our report
SSO & Cross-Protocol Redirections

• Oauth’s redirect_uri access control is origin based
• If the token origin can be confused with any origin with a redirect-to-HTTP, attacker can steal token
  • Token is in URL fragment (preserved by redirection): attacker can inject script in HTTP response to steal it
• Cross-protocol redirection should be avoided
  • Attack built into Google: nossslsearch.google.com
Attack: Pinterest User Impersonation


HTTP/1.1 302 Location: U = https://www.pinterest.com/#token=XXX

http://api.pinterest.com

HTTP/1.1 302
Location: http://api.pinterest.com

*.pinterest.com

api.pinterest.com

http://api.pinterest.com

HTTP/1.1 302
Location: http://api.pinterest.com
TLS Session Cache

• 3 kinds of TLS authentication:
  • Certificate/PKIX
  • Valid session identifier in server cache
  • Valid session ticket encrypted by server key

• If a session cache or ticket key is shared across servers with different hosts, certificate check can be completely bypassed
  • VHC between domains that do not share certificates
Cross-certificate XSS against Mozilla
OK to reuse an existing connection to send a request if the domain of the new request is covered by the certificate validated when the session was created, and it points to the IP address of the peer of the existing connection.
Attack: SPDY Pooling Impersonation

• Attacker baits user to **click through a certificate warning** on an **unimportant domain** (e.g. captive portal on public Wifi)

• Unbeknown to the user, the certificate includes malicious SAN (e.g. *.google.com, *.facebook.com, ...)

• The attacker point the DNS of these domains his down IP to enable SPDY connection pooling, and triggers requests to collect cookies
  • Bypasses all TLS MitM defenses in Chrome (pinning...)
Attack: SPDY Pooling Impersonation

The site's security certificate is not trusted!
You attempted to reach localhost, but the server presented a certificate issued by an entity that is not trusted by your computer's operating system. This may mean that the server has generated its own security credentials, which Chrome cannot rely on for identity information, or an attacker may be trying to intercept your communications.

You should not proceed, especially if you have never seen this warning before for this site.

Proceed anyway  Back to safety

Help me understand

This should be impossible because of certificate pinning in Chrome
“Same-Certificate Policy” & HTTP2

- What does it mean security-wise when domains appear in the same certificate?

- Dangerous **new threat model**: attacker may inject himself **within the connection** used for honest requests
Impact of this Paper

• Fixed impersonation of Akamai CDN customers
• Improved TLS cache isolation in popular HTTPS multiplexers: Nginx (CVE-2014-3616), Stingray
• Fixed SPDY sharing oops in Chrome (CVE-2013-6659)
• Over $10,000 worth of bug bounties
• **Routing fallback remains unsolved**
• Connection sharing concerns remain in HTTP2
Thank you! Questions?

For further discussions, please attend the Web Security Architecture panel on the W3C track!

Thursday 14:00 in Sala della Scherma
User Contents & Other Weak Origins

• Common to use different top-level domain for user contents to avoid related-domain attacks (e.g. cookies)
  • dropboxusercontent.com, googleusercontent.com

• May be defeated by virtual host confusion if the weak & strong origins are in the same certificate
  • Transfer XSS in mxr.mozilla.org to addons.mozilla.org (Hansen & Sokol, HTTPS Can Byte Me, BH’10)

• Weakest origins should use separate certificates
Attack: Dropbox Account Theft

• Data on the user’s own account is often on a higher trust domain to access session cookie
  • Dropbox: own files on dl-web.dropbox.com
  • Certificate valid for *.dropbox.com

• Short lived cookie forcing allows temporary forcing of the attacker’s session

• Abuse VHC between dl-web and www subdomains to load malicious page under www.dropbox.com

• Recover victim session after forced cookie expires